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Responsible Shares and Shared Responsibility: In Defense of Responsible
Corporate Officer Liability
Abstract
When a corporation commits a crime, whom may we hold criminally liable? One obvious set of defendants
consists of the individuals who perpetrated the crime on the corporation's behalf. But according to the
responsible corporate officer ("RCO") doctrine, the government may also prosecute and punish those
corporate executives who, although perhaps lacking "consciousness of wrongdoing," nonetheless have "a
responsible share in the furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws>" In other words, under the
RCO doctrine, a corporate executive can come to bear criminal responsibility for an offense of her
corporation that she neither participated in nor culpably failed to prevent. As long as the executive in question
had the authority to prevent the corporate crime and failed to do so, she may be targeted in a criminal suit.
The RCO doctrine plainly poses a challenge to our traditional understanding of criminal culpability, according
to which guilt is individual—one may be held responsible only for a wrong one has personally committed,
and only if one has done so with a guilty mind. Thus, RCO liability, while representing the most common
instance of strict criminal liability, has been deemed “at odds with fundamental notions of our criminal justice
system,” and likened to the primitive doctrine of frankpledge, under which innocent members of a group
could be punished for the wrongful deed of one of their fellows. On the other hand, corporate crimes have an
irreducibly collective aspect. If we take this aspect seriously, as this paper does, then departures from the
paradigm of individual culpability may well be warranted. In particular, we may be justified in assigning
responsibility not just to the corporate crime’s immediate perpetrators, but also to those who held prominent
positions within the corporation at the time of the crime’s occurrence, and this responsibility may license just
the kind of criminal liability that the RCO doctrine contemplates. This paper seeks to determine the
circumstances under which this extension of responsibility is permissible, and the grounds of its
permissibility.
More specifically, this Article critiques existing justifications for the doctrine by arguing that these mistakenly
construe it as a kind of negligence liability, and in so doing deprive the doctrine of its transformative power. It
next offers a defense of the doctrine, according to which personal guilt is not necessary, and then contends
with objections to the doctrine, arguing that we need not dispense with the doctrine altogether in order to
avoid the concerns of its critics. What is needed instead is a set of guidelines that guard against the doctrine’s
misuse or abuse. Finally, this Article ends with a specification of these guidelines.
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When a corporation commits a crime, whom may we hold
criminally liable? One obvious set of defendants consists of
the individuals who perpetrated the crime on the
corporation's behalf. But according to the responsible
corporate officer ("RCO") doctrine, the government may also
prosecute and punish those corporate executives who,
although perhaps lacking "consciousness of wrongdoing,"
nonetheless have "a responsible share in the furtherance of
the transaction which the statute outlaws." In other words,
under the RCO doctrine, a corporate executive can come to
bear criminal responsibility for an offense of her corporation
that she neither participated in nor culpably failed to prevent.
As long as the executive in question had the authority to
prevent the corporate crime and failed to do so, she may be
targeted in a criminal suit.
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Greenwald, Jonelle Lesniak and Joyce Shin provided excellent research
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COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW
The RCO doctrine plainly poses a challenge to our
traditional understanding of criminal culpability, according
to which guilt is individual-one may be held responsible
only for a wrong one has personally committed, and only if
one has done so with a guilty mind. Thus, RCO liability,
while representing the most common instance of strict
criminal liability, has been deemed "at odds with
fundamental notions of our criminal justice system,"and
likened to the primitive doctrine of frankpledge, under which
innocent members of a group could be punished for the
wrongful deed of one of their fellows. On the other hand,
corporate crimes have an irreducibly collective aspect. If we
take this aspect seriously, as this paper does, then departures
from the paradigm of individual culpability may well be
warranted. In particular, we may be justified in assigning
responsibility not just to the corporate crime's immediate
perpetrators, but also to those who held prominent positions
within the corporation at the time of the crime's occurrence,
and this responsibility may license just the kind of criminal
liability that the RCO doctrine contemplates. This paper
seeks to determine the circumstances under which this
extension of responsibility is permissible, and the grounds of
its permissibility.
More specifically, this Article critiques existing
justifications for the doctrine by arguing that these
mistakenly construe it as a kind of negligence liability, and in
so doing deprive the doctrine of its transformative power. It
next offers a defense of the doctrine, according to which
personal guilt is not necessary, and then contends with
objections to the doctrine, arguing that we need not dispense
with the doctrine altogether in order to avoid the concerns of
its critics. What is needed instead is a set of guidelines that
guard against the doctrine's misuse or abuse. Finally, this
Article ends with a specification of these guidelines.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When the government announced that it was charging
the hedge fund SAC with insider trading, the Wall Street
Journal responded with an editorial bearing the subtitle:
"Can a criminal enterprise be run by someone who isn't a
criminal?"1 The Journal was reacting to the government's
decision not to prosecute SAC's namesake, founder, sole
owner, and CEO, Steven A. Cohen. The editorial argued
that if Cohen was innocent of the charges, then his
corporation must be innocent as well. But we might ask
instead: "If an enterprise has committed a crime, isn't its
leader necessarily a criminal?"2
This Article seeks to defend an affirmative answer to that
question. In particular, the Article argues that executives
should, at least in some cases, be prosecuted and punished
for their corporation's crimes independent of their
participation in, or even foreknowledge of, those crimes. It
seeks to provide guidelines for determining in which cases
executive criminal liability is appropriate.
The question seems especially apt in light of recent and
dramatic instances of corporate crime, which have led to
glaringly few prosecutions of the individuals who helm the
offending corporations. The government has not charged a
single high-level executive at any of the Wall Street banks
whose wrongdoing helped precipitate the financial crisis.3
1 Editorial, The Troubling SAC Case, WALL ST. J., Jul. 26, 2013 at
A12.
2 This point was raised in a recent Washington Post online op-ed. See
Amy Sepinwall, Op-Ed, Criminal Enterprises and Culpable Leaders,
WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.
comlblogs/on-leadership/wp/2013/11/12/criminal-enterprises-and-culpable-
leaders/.
3 As one commentator colorfully put it, "No man or woman who led
one of the firms directly culpable for the catastrophe has been put in a
prison-orange jumpsuit." Neil Irwin, This Is a Complete List of Wall Street
CEOs Prosecuted For Their Role in the Financial Crisis, WASH. POST
WONKBLOG (Sept. 12, 2013, 9:54 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.coml
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/09/l2lthis-is-a-complete-list-of-wall-street-ceos-
prosecuted-for-their-role-in-the-financial-crisis/. See also Jesse Eisinger,
Why the SEC Won't Hunt Big Dogs, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 26, 2011, 11:56 AM),
http://www.propublica.org/thetrade/item/why-the-sec-wont-hunt-big-dogs
("No major investment banker has been brought up on criminal charges
stemming from the financial crisis."); Jason Ryan, DOJ Will Not Prosecute
Goldman Sachs in Financial Crisis Probe, ABC NEWS (Aug. 9, 2012, 8:38
[Vol. 2014COL UMBIA B USINESS LA W REI1E W
No. 2:371] RESPONSIBLE SHARES AND SHARED RESPONSIBILITY 375
Nor are executives in the financial sector unique in their
apparent immunity to criminal prosecution. Inadequate
controls are all too prevalent at big pharmaceutical
companies, where drug recalls are at all-time highs, and yet
the frequency of criminal prosecutions is appallingly low.4
Similarly, executives have escaped criminal liability at BP,
where an explosion on the Deepwater Horizon led to eleven
deaths and the worst oil spill in American history.'
PM), http://abcnews.go.comlblogs/politics/2012/08/doj-will-not-prosecute-
goldman-sachs-in-financial-crisis-probe (noting a series of "high-profile
investigations" that the Department of Justice declined to prosecute);
Sarah White, RPT-In Post-Lehman Clean-Up, Top Banker Prosecutions
Stumble, REUTERS, Sep. 14, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com
article/2013/09/14/lehman-fiveyear-crime-idUSL5NOH929A20130914 ("In
the United States,... no top executives at large Wall Street or commercial
banks have been convicted of criminal charges relating to the 2008
crisis.").
4 For example, in 2010, Johnson & Johnson issued record-breaking
numbers of drug recalls. See Johnson & Johnson's Recall Rap Sheet, Bus.
WK. MAG., Mar. 31, 2011, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/
11_15/b4223066662101.htm; Gardiner Harris, Johnson & Johnson Settles
Bribery Complaint for $70 Million in Fines, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2011, at B3
("The company has issued more than 50 product recalls since the start of
last year involving such household brands as Tylenol, Motrin, Rolaids and
Benadryl."); Parija Kavilanz, Drug Recalls Surge, CNNMONEY (Aug. 16,
2010, 11:40 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/08/16/news/companies/
drug-recall surge/index.htm (describing the skyrocketing number of drug
recalls over the last year, including a four-fold increase in recalls relative
to the previous year). In response, the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") announced that it would seriously consider prosecuting individual
executives. See, e.g., CNN, FDA May Prosecute Execs over Violations:
Agency Hints It Will Become More Aggressive About Enforcing Its
Regulations, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 25, 2010, at 43 ("FDA Commissioner
Margaret Hamburg wrote to Sen. Chuck Grassley, R-Iowa, in March to say
that the agency intends to consider 'the appropriate use of misdemeanor
prosecutions, a valuable enforcement tool, to hold responsible corporate
officials accountable."'). Yet no executives were ever charged.
5 So far, the government has sought to prosecute only four
individuals. Two of them were supervisors on the ship. See Erin Fuchs,
The BP Prosecutions Show a New Strategy For the Justice Department,
Bus. INSIDER (Nov. 16, 2012, 11:42 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
who-are-the-indicted-bp-executives-2012-11. The third, Kurt Mix, is an
engineer charged with obstruction of justice after deleting text messages
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Furthermore, executive impunity seems to be the norm at
mining companies where substandard safety conditions lead
to explosions and deaths.6  Executives at companies
manufacturing and distributing defective products seem to
enjoy similar immunity even though the entity itself might
be liable in a civil suit. Those executives who knew about
the defect and yet failed to recall the product or even warn
the public escape unscathed.7
It is no surprise, then, that the public is clamoring to see
the heads of these companies roll,' and with good reason.
For one thing, executive convictions have an undeniable
deterrent power. As one commentator notes,
The threat of prison can change a culture faster and
more effectively than even the heftiest fine. If, after
the Texas City explosion, one BP executive or more
relating to the spill. See Susan Bozorgi, Women Criminal Defense
Attorneys: Joan McPhee Defends BP Engineer Involved in Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill, WOMEN CRIM. DEF. Arr ys BLOG (Feb. 20, 2013),
http://www.womencriminaldefenseattorneys.com/women-criminal-defense-
attorneys-joan-mcphee-defends-bp-engineer-involved-in-deepwater-
horizon-oil-spill/. Notably, none of them is a high-level BP official. The
highest-ranking target is David Rainey, a vice-president of Gulf Coast
operations, who is being prosecuted not for the spill itself but instead, like
Mix, for obstructing the government's investigation. See Fuchs, supra.
6 See Howard Berkes, Mine Disaster Probe Leads to Conspiracy
Charges Against Former Executive, NPR: THE TwO-WAY (Nov. 28, 2012,
10:11 AM), http://www.npr.orgblogs/thetwo-way/2012/11/28/166064046
/mine-disaster-probe-leads-to-conspiracy-charges-against-former-executive
("Mining company executives are rarely charged when miners die in
accidents.").
7 See generally Robert Steinbuch, The Executive-Internalization
Approach to High-Risk Corporate Behavior: Establishing Individual
Criminal Liability for the Intentional or Reckless Introduction of
Excessively Dangerous Products or Services Into The Stream Of Commerce,
10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 321, 321-39 (2007) (detailing reams of
cases in which corporations were sued for distributing defective products
but their executives were not held criminally liable).
8 See, e.g., Four in Five Want Bankers Prosecuted, SKYNEWS (July 1,
2012, 3:07 PM), http://news.sky.com/story/954671/four-in-five-want-
bankers-prosecuted; White, supra note 3 ("[T]he debate over how to hold
senior bank bosses to account for failures is far from over, but legal
sanctions for top executives remain a largely remote threat.").
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had been prosecuted, it seems to me quite likely that
the Deepwater Horizon accident would never have
happened. A prison sentence would have done the
thing that all those fines never did: force the
company to begin paying attention to safety. 9
In addition, targeting individuals allows prosecutors to
evade the purported systemic risks of going after entities
that are "too big to jail," or prompting dissolution of entities
that are "too big to nail"l--e.g., those whose innocent low-
level employees are then left without work, as was the fate of
most of Arthur Andersen's 28,000 employees in the wake of
its demise.11
Nonetheless, those intent on seeing justice done must find
the legal tools with which to mete it. The problem is that
criminal law typically requires that a defendant culpably
cause the conduct with which she is charged, yet corporate
officers in the financial, mining, or big pharmaceutical sector
may not have participated in the crimes of their corporation.
If we seek to prosecute corporate executives only if and
where we can prove that they culpably contributed to their
corporation's crime, we will see few, if any, individual
prosecutions, let alone successful ones.12
But we need be neither so narrow nor so exacting in our
response. Instead, we can and should target executives at
wrongdoing corporations independent of whether they
participated in the wrongdoing. The requisite legal ground
for doing so can be found in the responsible corporate officer
9 Joe Nocera, Op-Ed, How to Prevent Oil Spills, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 14,
2012, at A19.
10 Kathleen M. Boozang, Symposium, Responsible Corporate Officer
Doctrine: When is Falling Down on the Job a Crime?, 6 ST. Louis U. J.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 77, 87 (2012).
11 See Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons
of the Arthur Andersen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107, 107 (2006).
12 See generally White, supra note 3 (noting the near absence of
executive prosecutions in the wake of the financial crisis and explaining it
in this way: "At issue is the difficulty in pinning the blame on any one
person for risks and decisions taken throughout a firm--one of the main
obstacles to building such cases so far.").
(RCO) doctrine. The Supreme Court articulated the RCO
doctrine in 1946, and it is designed to target those executives
who, although perhaps lacking "consciousness of
wrongdoing, ' 13 nonetheless have "a responsible share in the
furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws. ' 14
In other words, the doctrine permits the prosecution and
punishment of corporate executives who have not
participated in their corporation's crime, even if they had no
knowledge of the crime at the time of its occurrence. Just so
long as the executive in question had the authority to
prevent the crime and failed to do so, she may be targeted in
criminal prosecution. 15 For this reason, the RCO doctrine
has been deemed "potentially vastly more powerful-because
lack of knowledge is not a defense-than other sources of
liability for [executives] that have been much more analyzed
in recent years (for example, securities laws and
Disney / Caremark/ Stone v. Ritter).'"1"
Perhaps because of its vast power and expansive reach,
the RCO doctrine is reviled not just by the White Collar
Defense bar, but also by most scholars and commentators as
well. 17  Their objections are of two types. The first is
13 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943).
14 Id. (emphasis added).
15 See infra Part III.A.
16 Erik Gerding, U.S. Suits Against Drug Executives: The "Responsible
Corporate Officer" Doctrine Lives, THE CONGLOMERATE (Sept. 14, 2011),
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/09/us-suits-against-drug-executives-
the-responsible-corporate-officer-doctrine-lives.html. Cf. Steven M.
Morgan & Allison K. Obermann, Perils of the Profession: Responsible
Corporate Officer Doctrine May Facilitate a Dramatic Increase in Criminal
Prosecutions of Environmental Offenders, 45 Sw. L.J. 1199, 1199-1200
(1991) (noting the broad applicability of the responsible corporate officer
doctrine in the "ever expanding" criminal enforcement context).
17 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the
Punishment of Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1359, 1359 (2009)
(likening RCO liability to the primitive doctrine of Frankpledge, under
which innocent members of a group could be punished for the wrongful
deed of one of their fellows); Jennifer Bragg, John Bentivoglio & Andrew
Collins, Onus of Responsibility: The Changing Responsible Corporate
Officer Doctrine, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 525, 525 (2010) (contending that the
doctrine is "at odds with fundamental notions of our criminal justice
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principled: prosecuting and punishing executives who did not
participate in the corporate crime, they argue, violates the
foundational tenet of Anglo-American criminal law that
"there can be no crime, large or small, without an evil
mind."18 The second is practical: even if some executives who
did not participate in the corporate crime deserve to be
punished, many others do not, and nothing in the RCO
doctrine itself provides a principled basis upon which to
distinguish between the two sets of executives. As such, the
argument would go, the RCO doctrine is subject to
prosecutorial over-reach and abuse. 19
system"). Cf. Martin Petrin, Circumscribing the "Prosecutor's Ticket to
Tag the Elite"--A Critique of the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine,
84 TEMP. L. REV. 283, 286 (2012) ("In many cases, the RCO doctrine
represents an unwarranted augmentation of corporate agents' duties and
runs contrary to established tort, criminal, and corporate law principles.").
18 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW 192 § 287 (John M. Zane
and Carl Zollman eds., 9th ed. 1923). See also Williamson v. Norris, [1898]
1 Q. B. 7, 14 (Eng.) ("The general rule of English law is, that no crime can
be committed unless there is mens rea.").
19 Two recent examples of scholarship taking issue with the
application of the RCO doctrine include Petrin, supra note 17 and Andrew
C. Baird, Comment, The New Park Doctrine: Missing the Mark, 91 N.C. L.
REV. 949, 952 (2013) (objecting to the exclusion from federal programs
that can accompany an RCO conviction). I address problems in the
application of the RCO doctrine in Part V.A, infra.
Richard Singer and Doug Husak have argued that even if the RCO
doctrine is defensible within the context in which it has been employed-
for violations of food and drug regulations-it would be untoward to seek
to extend the doctrine outside of the FDA context. Richard Singer and
Douglas Husak, Of Innocence and Innocents: The Supreme Court and
Mens Rea Since Herbert Packer, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 859, 877 (1999)
("Other cases are so easily distinguishable on their facts that Dotterweich
and Park-both FDA cases-stand as the high water marks of strict
criminal liability in the United States Supreme Court. Thus, any
application of the general doctrine of strict criminal liability to areas
outside the Food and Drug Act is problematic under the holdings of the
Court-even if Park actually imposes strict liability." (internal footnote
omitted)). Singer and Husak are surely right that a bald transposition of
the doctrine from one context to another would be illicit. The purpose of
this article is to provide the justificatory tools that would render the
transposition legitimate.
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This Article seeks to counter these objections in three
stages. First, it presents an account that justifies imposing
criminal liability on the executive simply by virtue of her
leadership role within the corporation. It then addresses
each of the purportedly problematic applications of the RCO
doctrine and argues that none of them are inevitable under
the doctrine, and so none of them represent a knockdown
argument against RCO liability. Finally, it articulates
guidelines for the doctrine's application that will prevent its
abuse.
The RCO doctrine has been disserved not just by its
critics, but by its defenders as well. In response to the
charge that RCO liability is an illicit form of strict criminal
liability, defenders of the doctrine have justified it as a
species of negligence liability instead. These defenses
deviate problematically from the doctrine's original
rationale, and do not adequately justify RCO liability. Nor
does the doctrine find adequate support in the handful of
recent calls to extend it beyond the health and
environmental context.2 ° In fact, these articles fail to take
up the justificatory question at all, either because they
contemplate a version of the doctrine in which the indicted
officer acted negligently or worse21--in which case she would
deserve punishment on a traditional understanding of
culpability-or else they seek to defend the doctrine on
deterrence or distributive justice, and not retributive,
grounds.22 In this way, these calls to deploy the doctrine do
20 See Christina M. Schuck, Note, A New Use for the Responsible
Corporate Officer Doctrine: Prosecuting Industry Insiders for Mortgage
Fraud, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 372, 373 (2010); see generally Tyler
O'Connor, Prosecuting Executives for Financial Fraud: The Responsible
Corporate Officer Doctrine as an Alternative Means of Criminal Liability
(Apr. 1, 2013) (draft manuscript) (on file with author) (advocating for the
imposition of strict criminal liability on corporate bankers under the RCO
doctrine).
21 See Schuck, supra note 20, at 379-80 (discussing theories under
which individuals for a corporation are typically held criminally liable).
22 See generally O'Connor, supra note 20 (urging an extension of the
RCO doctrine to executives at entities that have engaged in financial
fraud, and arguing that the extension is beneficial because it will deter
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not endeavor to establish that, on the basis of the RCO
doctrine, any officer who plays an active role in the
corporation can be held to deserve punishment.23 In other
words, these other efforts do not justify the very features of
the doctrine that render it so radical and powerful.24 This
Article aims to supply the missing theoretical and practical
pieces.
Part II presents an overview of the RCO doctrine and the
reasons for its development. Part III traces the development
of the doctrine and efforts to defend it, and argues that the
proffered justifications both betray the doctrine's rationale
and fail to convince. Part III ends by arguing that the
doctrine can be justified, if at all, only by an account of
responsibility that transcends the constraints of the
individualist paradigm. Part IV seeks to provide the
requisite account through an analogy to executive
compensation. It notes that we reward an executive where
her firm's performance improves even if the executive has
not noticeably or significantly contributed to the
improvement. By the same token, this Article argues, the
circumstances under which we may punish an executive for
her firm's wrongful act also need not require that the
executive have contributed to the wrongdoing. Instead, the
rationale for both rewards and punishments flows from a
proper conception of the executive's role within the firm,
which Part IV elucidates. With the justification for executive
criminal liability in hand, Part V turns to objections to the
RCO doctrine, and argues that each of them is beside the
point, or otherwise unconvincing. That effort will allow us to
see where the RCO doctrine has, and has not, been properly
applied, and will provide guidelines for its future application,
which the end of Part V articulates. Part VI concludes.
misconduct and fair because the executive is, relative to investors, the
least cost avoider).
23 An exception to this inattention to desert can be found in a piece by
Kathleen Boozang, supra note 10, at 111-12, where she argues that
corporate officers can come to deserve responsibility for the wrongs of their
corporation independent of their participation in those wrongs.
24 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
II. RCO LIABILITY: AN UNABASHED EFFORT TO
DETER CORPORATE CRIME THROUGH STRICT
CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE
EXECUTIVES
The RCO doctrine developed at a time when federal law
was much more comfortable with public welfare offenses
than it is now.25 Part II seeks to describe the doctrine's
elements, and the concerns that motivated its adoption.
A. Doctrinal Elements
While in some cases the RCO doctrine is used to
prosecute and punish an executive who carried out the
corporation's crime,26 the standard case involves a corporate
officer who neither participated in, nor perhaps even knew
about, the corporation's criminal conduct.27
25 For example, one major impetus for the Model Penal Code was a
rejection of strict liability criminal offenses, and a commitment to
subjective culpability with respect to each and every mental state element
of a crime. See Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law Reform and the
Persistence of Strict Liability, 62 DuKE L.J. 285, 287-88 (2012).
26 See United States v. Higgins, CR No. 09-403-4, 2011 WL 6088576,
at *10 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2011) ("Unlike Park, this matter does not involve
holding an unaware corporate executive accountable for vermin in a
warehouse.... Higgins' case stands apart from other Park doctrine cases
because the criminal conduct at issue is his own.").
27 See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285-86
(Murphy, J., dissenting) ('There is no evidence in this case of any personal
guilt on the part of the respondent. There is no proof or claim that he ever
knew of the introduction into commerce of the adulterated drugs in
question, much less that he actively participated in their introduction.
Guilt is imputed to the respondent solely on the basis of his authority and
responsibility as president and general manager of the corporation."). See
also Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 140 F.2d 61, 66 (4th Cir.
1944), affld, 323 U.S. 18 (1944) ("There is ample authority in support of
the principle that the directing heads of a corporation which is engaged in
an unlawful business may be held criminally liable for the acts of
subordinates done in the normal course of business, regardless of whether
or not these directing heads personally supervised the particular acts done
or were personally present at the time and place of the commission of
these acts." (citing Dotterweich)).
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This was the situation for Joseph Dotterweich, the
defendant in the case that inaugurated RCO liability.
Dotterweich, decided in 1943, arose in light of alleged
violations of the 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FFDCA), which made criminal, inter alia, the interstate
shipment of misbranded or adulterated drugs.2 8 There were
two defendants in the case, the Buffalo Pharmacal Company,
Inc., a "jobber" in drugs (e.g., a company that purchased
drugs from their manufacturer, repackaged the drugs under
its own label, and then sold the repackaged drugs to
pharmacies), and Dotterweich himself, president and general
manager of the company. At trial, the jury acquitted Buffalo
Pharmacal, but found Dotterweich guilty of two counts of
shipping misbranded drugs and one count of shipping
adulterated drugs.2 9 Dotterweich appealed. At issue was
whether the FFDCA's use of the term "person," referring to
the party who would be subject to prosecution for FFDCA
violations, applied only to the corporation or instead to the
individuals through which the corporation acted. °  The
Court of Appeals adopted the former, narrower reading and
in a 2-1 decision held that the conviction could be sustained
only if Buffalo Pharmacal was a mere alter ego for
Dotterweich. The Court of Appeals would have remanded for
a finding of fact on this question, 31 but the government
appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed the appellate
court's ruling below in a 5-4 decision.
The Court based its decision on the policy reasons
underpinning the criminal liability provisions of the FFDCA,
stating,
The purposes of this legislation ... touch phases of
the lives and health of people which, in the
circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely
beyond self-protection .... The prosecution to which
28 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 351-352
(2012).
29 See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 278.
30 See id. at 279.
31 See id.
Dotterweich was subjected is based on a now familiar
type of legislation whereby penalties serve as
effective means of regulation. 32
The Court reasoned that were the FFDCA to apply only to
corporations, and not their officers, the law would treat the
offenses as a mere 'license fee for the conduct of an
illegitimate business.' 33  Individual liability was therefore
necessary to adequately protect against the conduct that
Congress sought to outlaw. The Court recognized that
criminal liability under its construction of the FFDCA would
be strict: "Such legislation dispenses with the conventional
requirement for criminal conduct-awareness of some
wrongdoing.3 4  It nonetheless concluded that the grave
dangers the FFDCA sought to deter justified this departure
from the traditional grounds of culpability, noting that "[iln
the interest of the larger good [RCO liability] puts the
burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent
but standing in responsible relation to a public danger."3 5
And thus Responsible Corporate Officer liability was born.
Even at its inception, the RCO doctrine was controversial.
Justice Murphy authored a vigorous dissent in Dotterweich,
noting that the Court's position contravened the
"fundamental principle of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence that
guilt is personal. .. .. 3' But he nonetheless would have
allowed for strict criminal liability here had Congress
explicitly authorized prosecution of officers-and not just
corporations-under the FFDCA. His principal concern,
then, lay with what he took to be a violation of the principle
of legality:
Congress alone has the power to define a crime and
to specify the offenders. It is not our function to
supply any deficiencies in these respects, no matter
32 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280-81.
33 Id. at 282-83 (citing the House Committee Report accompanying
adoption of the 1938 FFDCA).
34 Id. at 281.
35 Id. at 281 (emphasis added).
36 Id. at 286.
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how grave the consequences. Statutory policy and
purpose are not constitutional substitutes for the
requirement that the legislature specify with
reasonable certainty those individuals it desires to
place under the interdict of the Act .... Looking at
the language actually used in this statute, we find a
complete absence of any reference to corporate
officers.
3 7
Yet subsequent decision-makers, as well as scholarly
supporters of the RCO doctrine, seem to have taken the
concern about strict criminal liability far more seriously. For
that reason, they have sought to reconstruct the doctrine as
a species of liability that more closely hews to the law's
traditional understanding of culpability, as described below.
III. SPURIOUS ATTEMPTS TO DEFEND THE RCO
DOCTRINE
Several rationales have been adduced to support criminal
liability for the non-culpable corporate officer. In broad
terms, these rationales can be grouped into four categories:
first, those that understand RCO liability as a kind of
negligence; second, those that focus on the unique nature of
corporate conduct, which necessarily requires human
participation; third, those that support RCO liability as a
tool to target executives who culpably participated in the
corporation's crime but against whom there is insufficient
evidence for a conviction; and, finally, fourth, those
rationales that rest upon the officer's willing assumption of
the risk of liability inherent in her office. This part
addresses each in turn, and argues that none provides a
compelling defense of the doctrine.
A. RCO Liability as Negligence
The Court did not have occasion to revisit the RCO
doctrine until United States v. Park, decided some thirty
37 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 287 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (internal
citations omitted).
years after Dotterweich. The defendant in that case was
John Park, the president and chief executive officer of Acme
Supermarkets. The case also involved violations of the
FFDCA, except here the violations were due to a rodent
infestation in a Baltimore Acme warehouse." Park, whose
office was in Philadelphia, and whom the Baltimore
warehouse manager had assured that the rodent problem
was being addressed, argued that he should not be convicted
because he had done everything he could to remedy the
violation. 9  The Court nonetheless affirmed Park's
conviction as a responsible corporate officer in an opinion
that largely endorsed the RCO doctrine as articulated in
Dotterweich.4 °
Even while Park largely reaffirmed the Court's
commitment to faultless criminal liability for corporate
executives, the Court betrayed its ambivalence about the
RCO doctrine's departure from the traditional conception of
culpability.41 The Court casted the elements of an RCO
offense in language steeped with moral weight.42 It noted
38 See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 661-62 (1975).
39 See id. at 663-64.
40 See id. at 671-73.
41 Norman Abrams recognizes the Court's wavering conception of the
RCO doctrine as a species of strict liability. See Norman Abrams,
Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for Strict Liability Offenses-A
Comment on Dotterweich and Park, 28 UCLA L. REv. 463, 475 (1981).
("Dotterweich and Park are subject to diverse interpretations. In tandem,
they nicely illustrate how the Supreme Court has been unwilling or unable
to develop a doctrinal modification of strict liability for corporate officers in
unambiguous terms that avoids introducing confusion and uncertainty
into the law."). On the other hand, others continue to view the doctrine as
enshrining strict liability even in the wake of Park. See Kathleen F.
Brickey, Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for Strict Liability
Offenses-Another View, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1337, 1345-46 (1982). One
persuasive source regarding whether the Court in Park smuggled in a
negligence requirement can be found in Justice Stewart's dissenting
opinion, in which he wrote that, "[a]s [he] understand[s] the Court's
opinion," it includes the "language of negligence." 421 U.S. at 678-79
(Stewart, J. dissenting).
42 The full text of the portion of the opinion in which the Court casts
the executive's responsibility in the language of culpability reads:
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that the defendant did not merely occupy a position of
leadership at the time of his offense-he had a "duty" that he
"fail[ed] ... to fulfill. '4 3 Moreover, the failure was not merely
an omission, but a culpable one, in light of the serious
"circumstances" in question-namely circumstances where
the individual consumer's health and life may be at stake.44
Most notably, recognizing the potentially draconian nature of
RCO liability, 4 the Court articulated an affirmative defense
of "objective[] impossib[ility]."4  Under this defense, a
defendant rebuts the government's prima facie case if she
establishes that it would have been objectively impossible for
her to prevent the underlying violations. Thus, the RCO
doctrine holds "criminally accountable the persons whose
failure to exercise the authority and supervisory
responsibility reposed in them by the business organization
resulted in the violation complained of,"47 but it allows these
[T]he Government establishes a prima facie case when it
introduces evidence sufficient to warrant a finding by the trier
of the facts that the defendant had, by reason of his position in
the corporation, responsibility and authority either to prevent
in the first instance, or promptly to correct, the violation
complained of, and that he failed to do so. The failure thus to
fulfill the duty imposed by the interaction of the corporate
agent's authority and the statute furnishes a sufficient causal
link. The considerations which prompted the imposition of
this duty, and the scope of the duty, provide the measure of
culpability.
Park, 421 U.S. at 673-74.
43 Id.
44 "[T]his Court looked to the purposes of the Act and noted that they
'touch phases of the lives and health of the people which, in the
circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond self-
protection."' Id. at 668 (citing United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277,
280 (1943)).
45 "The requirements of foresight and vigilance imposed on
responsible corporate agents are beyond question demanding, and perhaps
onerous... " Id. at 672.
46 Id. at 673. See also United States v. New England Grocers Supply
Co., 488 F. Supp. 230, 235-36 (D. Mass. 1980) (discussing impossibility as
an affirmative defense).
47 Park, 421 U.S. at 671.
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persons to avoid liability where they can establish that it
would have been impossible for them to prevent the
violation. The Court concluded that in this case Park could
have remedied the rodent problem, and thus the objective
impossibility defense was not available to him.48
Nonetheless, introducing the objective impossibility
defense markedly shifted the RCO doctrine from a strict
liability to a negligence offense, greatly undercutting the
power and reach of the doctrine in subsequent cases. With
the impossibility defense available, only those defendants
who could have prevented the corporation's crime were
eligible for conviction.49  Furthermore, this eligibility
criterion implicitly altered the justification for holding the
corporate officer criminally liable. An executive may be
found guilty under the RCO doctrine only if (1) she had the
responsibility and the authority to prevent the crime; (2) it
would have been possible for her to prevent the crime; and
(3) she failed to do so.50 An executive's culpability now rests
on her own delinquency, and not on the liability she incurs
solely due to her role within the corporation.
48 See Park, 421 U.S. at 677.
49 Different courts will construe more or less broadly what it would
have been possible for the defendant to do. Thus, for example, in Park the
Court accepted the government's contention that it was possible for the
president of a large supermarket chain to implement a rodent abatement
plan in a warehouse located in a state other than the one where the
defendant worked. See id. at 673. See also United States v. Starr, 535
F.2d 512, 515 (9th Cir. 1976) (concluding that allegations that food
violations resulted from the "natural phenomenon" of vermin fleeing a
nearby plowed field to contaminate a warehouse, and subsequent third-
party sabotage of corrective efforts, did not negate the warehouse's duty of
"foresight and vigilance" to support an objective impossibility defense). On
the other hand, other courts have held the defendant to a less demanding
standard in their understanding of what it was possible for the defendant
to have prevented. See, e.g., Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 298 (Ind. 2012)
(citing Comm'r, Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. v. RLG, Inc., 755 N.E.2d 556 (Ind.
2001)) (noting that corporation's sole officer could only be held liable under
RCO doctrine if, at a minimum, he knew or should have known about the
offense).
50 Park, 421 U.S. at 671-73.
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The RCO doctrine has played out in state courts in even
more reactionary ways. For instance, in Rooney v.
Commonwealth, the Virginia Court of Appeals reversed the
conviction of the president of a cemetery company accused of
failing to deposit preneed and perpetual care funds into a
trust account, as required by statute. 51 The court adopted a
very narrow interpretation of the RCO doctrine that
"impose[d] criminal responsibility only upon the officer or
officers who are directly responsible or accountable for the
corporation's compliance" with the violated statute.52 In this
case, the court found that there was no reason to think that
compliance with the statute was part of the president's job
description, and thus it overturned his conviction. 53 But if it
is doubtful that the president in Rooney had a responsibility
to ensure that his company deposited the preneed and
perpetual care funds into a trust account, it is at least as
doubtful that John Park, the president of Acme, had a
responsibility to lay rat traps in a warehouse located 100
miles from his office. Thus, the Virginia court's requirement
of "direct" responsibility for the task that the statute
mandates incorrectly construes the RCO doctrine as a
species of negligence.
Similarly, other state courts adopting the RCO doctrine
maintain that they are following the Supreme Court's
formulation, but the elements they require to establish RCO
liability contemplate a far tighter connection between the
defendant's conduct and the corporate violation.54  For
example, Minnesota's formulation, which Indiana later
adopted,55 requires not only that the defendant be in a
position to prevent the violation, but also that the
51 See Rooney v. Commonwealth, 500 S.E.2d 830, 831 (Va. Ct. App.
1998).
52 Id. at 833 (emphasis added).
53 See id. at 832-33.
54 See, e.g., In re Dougherty, 482 N.W.2d 485, 490 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992) (requiring that "three essential elements" be satisfied before liability
is imposed under the RCO doctrine).
55 See Comm'r, Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. v. RLG, Inc., 755 N.E.2d 556,
561-62 (Ind. 2001).
defendant's actions or inactions facilitate the violation.56 In
this way, these state analogs have favored negligence over
strict liability. In fact, it is not just courts that have sought
to appease the doctrine's critics by lending it a negligence
construction. Commentators calling for the expanded use of
the RCO doctrine have also preferred the negligence
understanding of it. 57
Yet, it is not clear that it makes sense to construe the
doctrine as a species of negligence liability, or that doing so
would allay concerns about RCO liability. For one thing,
why should the defendant's (mere) negligence result in
criminal, rather than civil, liability? Scholars have argued
that deterrence can be secured at least as readily-and more
cheaply-through a civil suit.58 One might attempt to defend
the use of criminal liability by pointing to the moral
condemnation inherent in criminalizing an offense. It was
for this reason that the Court in Dotterweich insisted that
criminal liability was necessary, lest the Court otherwise
encourage a view of the FFDCA's criminal penalties as a
"license fee for the conduct of an illegitimate business."59
But the concern about moral meaning should be allayed just
so long as the corporation itself, and/or those of its members
who participated culpably in its offense, were facing criminal
liability. And there is a countervailing concern-namely,
56 Dougherty, 482 N.W.2d at 490 (formulating the RCO doctrine as
follows: "(1) the individual must be in a position of responsibility which
allows the person to influence corporate policies or activities; (2) there
must be a nexus between the individual's position and the violation in
question such that the individual could have influenced the corporate
actions which constituted the violations; and (3) the individual's actions or
inactions facilitated the violations.").
57 See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 20, at 371 (contemplating use of the
RCO doctrine to prosecute executives who have proceeded at least
negligently with respect to the corporate crime).
58 See Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate
Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 864 n.89 (1994); Daniel R.
Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 323
(1996); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It
Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1499 (1996).
59 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 282-83 (1943).
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that imposing criminal liability in the face of mere negligent
fault risks diluting the force of the criminal law.6"
In any event, there is reason to doubt whether a corporate
executive really could prevent her corporation's violation.
The impulse to lend a negligence construction to the RCO
doctrine is understandable because negligence imports a
measure of culpability that strict liability lacks, and thereby
renders criminal liability more palatable. The doctrine
permits this construction, because criminal liability under
the doctrine is not simply status-based, but rather depends on
the officer's "responsible relationship" to the violation,61 and
the officer can defend against liability if she can establish
that she could not have prevented the crime no matter what
she did. Nonetheless, negligence is a hollow justification for
prosecuting or punishing the corporate executive who is
several layers removed from the individuals participating in
the offending conduct, as John Park argued he was when
contesting his conviction for Acme's rodent infestation. Of
course, Park could have intervened to remedy the rodent
infestation, but is the president of a very large corporation
really expected to be laying rat traps and bait stations? 62
The RCO doctrine ignores the reality of the large,
decentralized modern corporation and its accompanying
economic benefits. It holds the corporate executive
criminally liable on the basis of a set of purported
expectations-that the high-ranking executive will monitor
60 See Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L.
REV. 55, 79-80 (1933); Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of
Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags to
Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 765 (2005); Paul H. Robinson,
Moral Credibility and Crime, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1993, at 72, 76.
61 See Friedman v. Sibelius, 755 F. Supp. 2d 98, 111 (D.D.C. 2010)
("As made clear by the Supreme Court, it is simply not the case that a
defendant can be convicted of a misdemeanor under the responsible
corporate officer doctrine based solely on his position within the corporate
hierarchy.").
62 By way of analogy, we might say that it is undoubtedly true that
President Obama has the power and authority to prevent drug deals from
occurring on the streets of Washington, D.C., but he also presumably has
better things to do with his time.
all facets of the company's operation-that few of us harbor.
The corporate executive may well be blameworthy-and Part
1V argues that she is-but it seems unsupportable to place
blame on her for a failure to prevent the kind of offenses that
the RCO doctrine paradigmatically contemplates.
Negligence, that is, fails to track the nature of the corporate
officer's responsibility.
B. The Ineluctable Human Contributions to Corporate
Crime
This rationale for the RCO doctrine focuses on the
corporation's unique ontology, where corporate action
necessarily requires human execution. Since the corporation
can act only through its members, the argument goes, its
crime necessarily redounds to them. Thus, for example, in a
Hawaii Supreme Court case involving an auto wrecking
company that had violated Hawaii's anti-burning statutes,
the court affirmed the conviction of the corporate president
and vice president on the ground that the company's illegal
acts could have occurred only at the hands of its human
members.63
One might respond that this ontological argument makes
too much of the corporation's parasitic reliance upon its
human members. The fact that the corporation can act only
through individuals is compatible with the corporation's
nonetheless bearing a guilty will. This is especially true
where no one individual who participates in carrying out the
corporation's crime satisfies the mens rea elements of the
crime individually even though, together, these various
individuals do. These are the facts of United States v. Bank
of New England,64 where the First Circuit affirmed the
63 See State v. Kailua Auto Wreckers, Inc., 615 P.2d 730, 736 (Haw.
1980). See also Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281 ('[Tjhe only way in which a
corporation can act is through the individuals who act on its behalf."
(citing New York Cent. & H.R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481
(1909))).
64 United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 855-56 (1st
Cir. 1987).
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bank's conviction for violating a reporting requirement even
though no one employee possessed all of the information
prompting the requirement, and thus no one employee knew
that reporting was required. The court found that it was
acceptable to aggregate the knowledge of several individuals
and impute this collective knowledge to the corporation as a
whole. The court thereby found that the corporation
satisfied the crime's knowledge requirement. The collective
knowledge doctrine has been ridiculed for its
implausibility65-rightly, in my opinion. The relevant point,
however, is that the fact that corporations cannot carry out
acts on their own does not establish that the humans who act
on their behalf necessarily come to bear culpability, just as
the individual employees in Bank of New England did not
bear culpability for having failed to produce the required
report.
Furthermore, even if it were the case that individuals
who together carried out the corporate crime were
necessarily guilty of that crime (or their contribution to it),
we would still not arrive at a justification for RCO liability.
After all, the RCO doctrine is typically invoked precisely
when the executive has not participated in the crime; if she
had, she could be prosecuted on a direct liability theory. One
could respond that the executive's omission was a but-for
cause of the corporation's crime and that, therefore, the
executive prosecuted under the RCO doctrine did contribute
to the crime's commission. But this proffered justification for
RCO liability has nothing to do with the corporation's unique
ontology-the executive would be liable not because the
corporation can act only through humans, but because she
had failed to fulfill her duty to prevent criminal violations, a
duty she bears with respect to her individual subordinates'
conduct just as much as with respect to the corporation's. In
other words, it is not the corporation's inability to act on its
65 See, e.g., David Luban, What's Pragmatic About Legal
Pragmatism?, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 70 (1996) (quoting Bank of New
England, 821 F.2d at 855-56) (deeming the collective knowledge doctrine
"as bizarre as announcing that four fiddlers playing in separate rooms
make a string quartet.").
own that would ground liability, but instead the executive's
purportedly culpable omission. This is a negligence account
of RCO liability and we have already seen that that account
is wanting.
C. An End-Run Around the Evidentiary Burdens of
Direct Liability
Some commentators defend the RCO doctrine because
they see it as a useful tool for a prosecutor who wants to
target an executive who is believed to have participated in
the corporation's crime, but against whom there would be
insufficient evidence to secure a conviction.66 If charging the
executive on a theory of direct liability looks untenable, the
RCO doctrine at least provides a second-best alternative. To
provide an example sympathetic to this line of defense,
imagine that police uncover the most convincing of smoking
guns, establishing that a CEO directed the corporate crime,
and perhaps even helped to carry it out, but the evidence in
question was acquired illegally and so is inadmissible. In
such a case, RCO liability provides a prosecutor with an
alternative route to criminal sanctions-to be sure, one that
carries lesser penalties than a conviction as an accomplice to
the crime, but nonetheless one that ensures that the
executive does not escape liability altogether.
As satisfying as this outcome may be, it does nothing to
bolster the case for RCO liability. Our desire to see the
executive pay for her crime would not justify convicting her
falsely, or through some other process involving a
miscarriage of justice. The justifiability of convicting her as
a responsible corporate officer turns on the justifiability of
RCO liability itself. If RCO liability is a travesty of justice,
as some jurists and commentators have argued, 67 then her
66 See Amiad Kushner, Comment, Applying the Responsible Corporate
Officer Doctrine Outside the Public Welfare Context, 93 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 681, 682 (2003) ("The strongest rationale for the [RCO]
doctrine does not lie in the activity sought to be regulated, but in the
elusiveness of the defendant sought to be prosecuted.").
67 See supra note 17.
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conviction under the doctrine is no more justifiable than her
conviction for some trumped-up charge. Thus, defenders of
the RCO doctrine need a justification independent of its
ability to ensnare guilty executives who would otherwise be
off the hook.
D. Consent to RCO Liability
A final justificatory strand points to the corporate officer's
willing assumption of the risk. For example, as various
courts have noted, the corporate officer knows in advance of
assuming her position the obligations of foresight and
vigilance that the corporate officer will come to bear, and the
corresponding liability she would come to incur if she were to
neglect to fulfill these. One can therefore infer her (at least)
tacit consent to the liability scheme.68 We are justified in
prosecuting and punishing her for her lapses, then, because
she willingly consented to the risk of liability when she
assumed her officer position.
In response, it should be noted that consent can furnish
no more than a necessary pre-condition for the imposition of
liability, and not a justification for it. Liability for the
corporate officer who did not participate in her corporation's
crime would indeed be deeply problematic if she had been
conscripted or otherwise compelled to hold her position in the
corporation. 69  But assuming that she came to hold the
68 See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975) ("The
requirements of foresight and vigilance imposed on responsible corporate
agents are beyond question demanding, and perhaps onerous, but they are
no more stringent than the public has a right to expect of those who
voluntarily assume positions of authority .... ."); United States v.
Morissette, 342 U.S. 246, 256 ("The accused, if he does not will the
violation, usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care than
society might reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might
reasonably exact from one who assumed his responsibilities.").
69 There is a more general version of this concern-viz., that shared
responsibility will cause individuals who share religious, ethnic, or racial
ties to bear responsibility for one another's acts-that likely accounts for a
good part of the resistance to the notion of shared responsibility. To be
clear, the account advanced here is intended to apply only to those groups
one joins freely, and in which one enjoys a genuine right of exit. Cf. Amy
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position freely, knowing and implicitly or explicitly
consenting to the exposure to liability that the position
entailed would not itself justify imposing the liability. To
put the point bluntly, the fact that someone is willing to die
for the sins of the rest of us does not make killing her
permissible. By the same token, more than the executive's
consent is necessary to justify responsible corporate officer
liability.
E. Summary
None of the four proffered rationales serve to justify
prosecuting and punishing executives for corporate crimes in
which they have not participated. It is nonetheless notable
that each of the four rationales attempts to shoehorn the
doctrine into the traditional understanding of criminal
liability as rooted in personal guilt. Thus, the negligence
rationale focuses on the corporate executive's purported
fault; the corporate ontology rationale seeks to identify a
culpable act element in the executive's omission; the
prosecutorial tool rationale presupposes the executive's
complicity; and the consent rationale foregrounds a kind of
voluntarism, or willing assumption of the risk, especially
congenial to the individualist paradigm. 0
It is easy to understand the impulse to assimilate the
responsible corporate officer doctrine to the prevailing
paradigm of criminal responsibility. Punishing someone who
is blameless is a disquieting prospect, to say the least.
Where the existing rationales go wrong, however, is in
presupposing that blame is warranted only in the face of
personal guilt. What is needed is not a rationale that
explains how the RCO doctrine is really a species of
Sepinwall, Citizen Responsibility and the Reactive Attitudes: Blaming
Americans for War Crimes in Iraq, in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR COLLECTIVE
WRONGDOING 231, 236 (Tracy Isaacs & Richard Vernon eds., 2011)
(discussing moral responsibility for actions one did not freely undertake).
70 Cf. Samuel Scheffler, Relationships and Responsibilities, 26 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 189, 191-92 (1997) ("In order to [owe a special] responsibility,
one must have performed some voluntary act that constitutes the ground
of the responsibility.").
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culpability as conventionally understood, but instead an
account that elucidates the reasons for which one may be
blameworthy even if one does not meet the hallmarks of guilt
on the individualist paradigm. Part IV briefly describes
what such an account might look like. Part V then turns to
the purported parade of horribles allegedly caused by the
RCO doctrine and argues that none of these results is
inevitable, and thus need not give us pause.
IV. DEFENDING RCO LIABILITY
While jurists and commentators have attempted to
defend the doctrine by situating it within the individual
culpability paradigm, we have seen that these defenses
ultimately fail to persuade. Yet, these tenacious efforts to
defend the doctrine might reflect a sense that crime
committed in the corporate setting is different from street
crime. Once there is a license to impute the criminal act to
the corporation as a whole, we might well wonder why the
only individuals who deserve to be blamed for it are those
who participated in it or culpably failed to prevent it. Might
it not be the case that those who are especially implicated in
the corporation itself ought to incur some blame for its
misdeeds, even if they have not contributed culpably to its
misdeeds? In other words, might the doctrine's supporters
have intuited that corporate executives are on the hook even
if they haven't participated in the corporate crime?
Participation is of course the sine qua non of culpability in
the garden-variety criminal case. But crime committed by
an institutional group is relevantly different from the
garden-variety criminal case. Part IV.A seeks to establish
this by focusing in particular on the relationship between the
executive and her corporation. 71
71 For a somewhat different and more elaborate argument for shared
executive responsibility, see generally Amy J. Sepinwall, Crossing the
Fault Line in Corporate Criminal Law (2014) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author) (advocating a novel theory of shared responsibility
that urges individual liability in certain circumstances independent of
whether that person is actually fault).
A. Rewarding and Punishing Executives
The public frequently denounces what it views as outsized
bonuses for corporate executives.72 While the size of these
bonuses might well warrant consternation, the grounds upon
which they are awarded are instructive for the purposes of
this Article.
As a matter of common sense, one might expect an
executive to receive a bonus where, and only where, she has
discernibly contributed to her company's success. In fact,
however, it is notoriously difficult to identify a causal
relationship between a firm's improved performance and
anything the executive in question did or did not do. 73 It is
partly for this reason that most corporate executives are
72 See Heather Landy, Growing Sense Of Outrage Over Executive Pay,
WASH. POST, Nov.15, 2008, at A8.
73 See Renee B. Adams et al., Powerful CEOs and Their Impact on
Corporate Performance, 18 REV. FIN. STUD. 1403, 1429-30 (2005); Joel M.
Podolny et al., Revisiting the Meaning of Leadership, 26 RES.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 1, 2 (2005); SYDNEY FINKELSTEIN & DONALD C.
HAMBRICK, STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP: ToP EXECUTIVES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON
ORGANIZATIONS (1996). More worryingly, perhaps, a study for the period
from 1993 to 2012 revealed that "[a]bout 40 percent of the highest-paid
CEOs in the United States over the past 20 years eventually ended up
being fired, paying fraud-related fines or settlements, or accepting
government bailout money." Nadia Damouni, Highest-Paid U.S. CEOs
Are Often Fired or Fined: Study, REUTERS, Aug. 28, 2013, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/28/us-companies-pay-idUSBRE97R
10C20130828 (describing a 2013 report by the Institute for Policy Studies).
But see Knowledge at Wharton: Outrage Over Outsized Executive
Compensation: Who Should Fix It and How?, WHARTON SCH. OF U. PA.
(Feb. 4, 2009), available at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/
Article.cfm?Articleid=2151 (referencing a study by Alex Edmans arguing
that pay correlates well with performance); Alex Edmans & Xavier
Gabaix, Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New Optional
Contracting Theories, 15 EUROPEAN FIN. MGMT 486, 494 (2009) ("A number
of features of observed compensation schemes appear to be inconsistent
with optimal contracting, and are thus frequently interpreted as evidence
of rent extraction .... [But] a number of recent theories . . . reach a
different conclusion. By incorporating complex, but realistic, aspects of
the employment relationship, these above features can be reconciled with
efficient pay-setting.").
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awarded bonuses so long as the corporation does well,
without regard for the executive's role in the corporation's
performance. 4 Of course, the executive who has made a
discernible positive difference might receive a greater bonus
still; the point for our purposes is that making a positive
difference is not necessary for the bonus to accrue.
The rationale for rewarding an executive any time her
corporation does well, independent of her role in the
corporation's success, is understandable not just on the basis
of the difficulty in tracing causal connections between
executive input and firm output. There is a principled
reason for this distribution of bonuses. The executive is
expected to proceed in her role in a way that recognizes that
her welfare and that of the corporation are intertwined; the
fates of both should rise and fall together. Providing the
executive with a bonus any time the corporation does well
honors this expectation, and rewards its fulfillment. Put
differently, society's treatment of the executive is distinct
from the way in which it assesses merit or desert in most
other contexts. Typically, an individual is rewarded for a job
well done, i.e., a job that she did well. It would frustrate our
commitment to meritocracy if we were to reward one
individual for the stellar performance of another absent a
connection between the two. The relevant connection-
indeed, the only one that we take to warrant departure from
the individualist mode of assessment with which we typically
proceed-is that both are members of the same team.
Consider the way we treat members of a four-person team
in a relay race. Suppose that the first of the four runners
has a bad day and runs considerably slower than usual-so
74 See, e.g., Symantec, FY13 Executive Annual Incentive Plan 2 (Mar.
31, 2012) (stipulating that the two performance metrics used to calculate
CEO's annual incentive bonus payment will be (1) corporate revenue and
(2) corporate earnings per share); PepsiCo, Proxy Statement Pursuant to
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 17 (Mar. 24, 2006)
("For the fiscal year 2005, [the CEO's] base salary continued to be capped
at $1,000,000. He was eligible for a 2005 annual incentive award because
PepsiCo achieved its pre-approved earnings target which was set to
achieve third quartile performance relative to peer companies.").
much so that at the end of her portion, her team is in last
place. The other three members of her team more than
make up for her slow speed and the team as a whole finishes
first. If medals are the token prize for the team's victory,
each of the four members of the team will receive a medal. It
would be odd-unseemly even-to deny the slow member a
winners' medal. Why is this?
Again, as with the case of the executive, the contribution
of any one member to the team's success is uncertain. To be
sure, we know how fast each member ran on race day, so we
can assess how each performed on that day. But there is
much that goes on leading up to, and affecting the outcome,
on race day. For all we know, the first runner might have
devised the team's training strategy, been the most potent
source of encouragement for the others, formed the team in
the first place, or kept the peace between the otherwise
fractious teammates. So, she may deserve a reward even if
her team won the relay race in spite of, rather than because
of, her race speed.
But again, as with the case of the executive, it is not mere
uncertainty about her role more broadly conceived that
justifies our treating her as just as much of a winner as her
teammates. We treat each member equally because that is
the right way to respond to members of a team. We expect
each one, and each of the team members expects the others,
to put the team first. This entails, among other things, that
each one of them conceives of the team's performance as a
joint output, for which all deserve equal credit.
The analogy to teams is more than merely felicitous.
Corporations have elsewhere been conceived of as teams, 75 in
recognition of both the ways in which the contributions of the
members of the corporation intertwine so as to problematize
individual assessments, and the ways in which we expect
members of the corporation to see themselves as united in a
whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. We reward
the executive whose contribution to the firm's success is
75 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory
of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 263-65 (1999).
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difficult to tease out, then, because even if she occupies a
place analogous to that of the slow member of the relay
team, she is still a part of the team and each member of the
team deserves credit when it does well.76
In sum, praise and reward are bestowed in the team
context-whether athletic or corporate-on the basis of the
performance of the team, not merely the performance of the
individual member. But this collective mode of assessment
should, and sometimes does, have implications for our
judgments of blame and sanction when the team
transgresses. If we subsequently learn that some, but not
all, members of the relay team were using illicit
enhancement drugs, all will be stripped of their victory and
their medals, and not just the drug users. This will be true
even if the members who were drug-free did not know, and
had no reason to know, of their teammates' use of the
performance enhancers. And it will remain true even if we
can be fairly certain that the team would have won even if
some of its members hadn't used performance enhancing
drugs-say, because its time was so much greater than the
next fastest team, and the time required to beat the next
fastest team would have been within the reach of the doping
team even if the latter's members hadn't used performance
enhancing drugs. In other words, even if the doping wasn't
necessary for the victory, all of the members are stripped of
their medals, not just those who engaged in doping.
Of greater relevance here, the practice of rewarding
executives when the corporation does well should have as its
corollary a practice of sanctioning the executive when the
76 See Blair & Stout, supra note 75, at 249-50. There is, of course,
one notable distinction between the relay and corporate team examples.
Each relay team member receives a medal, and each medal is,
presumably, qualitatively identical. Not so, quite obviously, with bonuses,
which will typically vary considerably in magnitude depending on the
recipient's corporate rank. The disparity arises because of the hierarchical
organization of the corporation, in contrast to the egalitarian structure of
the team. But the important point for our purposes is the fact of the
bonus-whether or not it gets bestowed depends on the corporation's
performance, and not in any direct way on the extent of the executive's
contributions to that performance.
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corporation does wrong. It will not do for the executive to
disclaim responsibility by insisting that she did not
participate in, or even know about the wrong, at the time of
its occurrence. If the wrong is a wrong of her corporation-
and the next part underscores the necessity of an antecedent
corporate wrong77-- then she must, as a matter of fulfilling
the obligations of team-spiritedness that her role demands of
her, accept blame for it, and whatever consequences blame
entails.
To be clear, the executive is on the hook not because she
accepted bonuses when the firm did well. If that were the
case, then she must, as a matter of consistency or reciprocity,
accept sanctions when it transgresses. That justification for
blame rests on a suspicion that the bonuses were not
deserved in the first place, and yet the executive didn't
complain about their bestowal, so she may not complain
about the bestowal of punishment either. If the reward
really was unwarranted, matters will not be remedied by
issuing a sanction that is no more warranted. Two wrongs
will not make the situation right.
Instead, I have been seeking to argue that there is a
sense in which the executive does deserve her bonus
independent of whether she (or anyone) can claim that she is
causally responsible for the firm's success. And the ground
of desert there entails as well that she deserves her
punishment independent of whether she (or anyone) can
claim that she is causally responsible for the firm's failing.
In particular, she deserves to bear responsibility for the
corporation's acts because in the corporate context, as is true
of all team contexts, desert need not turn on one's individual
contribution to success or failure, or laudable or reproachable
corporate conduct. Instead, it is sufficient that one was a
team member at the time of the conduct.
To be sure, we can think of lots of situations where it
would be unfair to punish the executive for a corporate
wrong in which she was not involved. The next part surveys
these situations and attempts to offer guidelines for avoiding
77 See infra Part V.A.2.
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them. The point for now is that it is appropriate to have the
executive's fate track that of the corporation-she is expected
to harbor an attachment to the corporation that causes her
to see her fate as entwined with that of the corporation-and
we are licensed in treating her in accordance with the
corporation's performance. Institutions like the corporation
(and the athletic team) have been organized as settings
where individualized assessment is both ill-suited and
unseemly because norms of solidarity are expected to govern.
Executives deserve to bear responsibility for corporate acts
because that is the way desert works in the team setting.
V. PROBLEMATIC RCO CASES AND GUIDELINES
FOR AVOIDING THEM
This Article has been focusing on what the executive
deserves just in virtue of her membership on the "team." It
has already allowed that while membership may often
provide a license for assigning the executive responsibility
for corporate wrongs, it does not always do so-sometimes
blaming and sanctioning the executive for a corporate wrong
in which she was not involved would result in too great an
unfairness. At this point one might ask, what is so special
about executives? Why do they, but not, say, janitors,
receive bonuses when the corporation does well, and why
should they, but not janitors, be eligible for punishment
when the corporation does wrong? And when should
executives be subject to blame and sanction in the first
place? Finally, assuming the executive is blameworthy, why
should her blameworthiness result in punishment? Why
wouldn't it be enough to subject the executive to the social
sanctions involved in rituals of reproach, without involving
the state's punitive machinery?
Part V.A seeks to answer these questions by surveying a
series of problematic RCO cases, and identifying where and
why each one goes wrong. That effort enables us, in Part
V.B, to formulate principles or guidelines for the proper
application of the RCO doctrine.
A. Misapplications of the RCO Doctrine
1. Buckyballs and Abuse
Buckyballs, small magnetic balls that can be stacked or
strung to create whatever shapes the user desires, were the
brainchild of two thirty-something New York entrepreneurs,
Craig Zucker and Jake Bronstein.78 They invented and
produced the office toy in 2009. By 2011, People magazine
had named it one of the five hottest trends of the year. It
was sold in over 5000 stores, including Brookstone and
Urban Outfitters and, by 2012, sales had reached ten million
dollars a year. 79 Then, in July 2012, the Consumer Product
Safety Commission ("CPSC") ordered Zucker and Bronstein
to develop a corrective action plan, and requested that stores
carrying Buckyballs remove the product from their shelves.8 0
The problem? The CPSC contended that the toys "pose a
risk of magnet ingestion by children below the age of fourteen,
who may... place single or numerous magnets in their
mouth. ' s  Ingested magnets can adhere to one another
across organ walls, like the intestines, and cause blockages
82 1 iand tears, resulting in serious injury or even death.
Buckyballs had been marketed to adults, and the packaging
indicated that they were intended for individuals thirteen and
up. Zucker concedes the possibility that young children
could misuse Buckyballs and suffer potential adverse health
consequences. But, he contends, the same is true for many
standard household items, like knives and staircases, as well
as goods commonly used by, if not also intended for, kids,
78 See Sohrab Ahmari, Craig Zucker: What Happens When a Man






82 Andrew Martin, Safety Worry Leads to End of a Popular Toy
Magnet, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2012, at B3.
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like hot dogs and balloons, both of which pose choking
hazards.8 3
Zucker and Bronstein initially refused to comply with the
CPSC's request that they voluntarily recall their product.
By the end of 2012, retailers no longer wanted to carry
Buckyballs and the legal battle with the CPSC had grown
too expensive to continue fighting. Zucker was done. He
dissolved the corporation he had formed to manufacture and
distribute Buckyballs.84 But the CPSC wasn't done with
Zucker. In February 2013, it claimed that, if Buckyballs
were determined to be defective, it would hold Zucker
personally liable for the cost of the recall, which the CPSC
put at $57 million.85 The legal ground for Zucker's (alleged)
liability? The RCO doctrine. 6  Importantly, this is an
invocation of the civil RCO doctrine; there is no allegation
that Zucker or the Buckyball distributing corporation
violated a criminal law. Nonetheless, the CPSC contends
that because Zucker, as CEO, was in a position of authority,
he had a responsibility to undertake the recall on his own. 87
Zucker's lawyers contend that the RCO suit is sheer
reprisal for a public relations campaign that sought to
embarrass the CPSC for what Zucker saw as its baseless war
against his product.8 8 But even if the CPSC's motives are
innocuous, its rationale is not. The lack of an alleged
criminal violation here is not in itself problematic; the RCO
doctrine has been widely used to hold executives liable in
civil suits for corporate violations of environmental or clean
83 See Ahmari, supra note 78.
84 See id.
85 See id.
86 See Mark Chenoweth, CPSC's Attack on Corporate CEO More





water statutes.8 9 The problem is that there is no finding of a
violation at all. The CPSC never established that Buckyballs
constitute a "substantial product hazard," as the statute
requires, before instituting a mandatory recall. 90 And if the
recall was not required, Zucker should not be held
responsible for paying for the CPSC's decision to pursue it
nonetheless.
Zucker's case highlights two potential dangers with the
RCO doctrine-that government officials would wield it in an
effort to: (1) retaliate against those who challenge the
government's authority; or (2) coerce compliance with
standards that the government desires, but is without legal
authority to enforce.
9 1
As distressing as these uses of the doctrine may be,- they
should not be taken to impugn the doctrine as a whole, or
even to suggest that there may be reasons for abandoning it
altogether. Because the government wields considerable
discretion when it comes to filing civil or criminal complaints
in the face of alleged legal violations, there is always the
possibility that it will engage in abuse. The RCO doctrine
does not provide unusual or excessively damaging
opportunities for abuse relative to other statutory or
doctrinal bases for governmental legal action. Furthermore,
while the RCO doctrine-because it targets individuals
rather than corporations-threatens to have more
devastating effects,92 the benefits of its use nonetheless
89 See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6) (2012) (expressly
providing that "responsible corporate officers" are among the "persons"
who can be prosecuted for any violations).
90 Chenoweth, supra note 86.
91 Id. ("If CPSC is given the power to threaten such a result in every
recall case, no recall will ever again be truly voluntary. The agency would
be able to coerce CEOs into conducting recalls in cases that could not be
proven 'substantial product hazards' in court because the CEOs would not
be willing to take a chance on incurring personal liability.").
92 Among the concerns that the dissent in Park noted was the fact
that although Park was convicted of a misdemeanor, and punished with a
meager $250 fine, a subsequent conviction for the same offense would have
carried a prison sentence of up to three years. See United States v. Park,
421 U.S. 658, 660, 666, 682-83 (1975) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
COL UMBIA B USINESS LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 2014
No. 2:371] RESPONSIBLE SHARES AND SHARED RESPONSIBILITY 407
outweigh the costs of its potential abuse. If the last Part
sought to argue that it is not unfair to hold executives
criminally liable, the Introduction and review of Dotterweich
sought to present reasons for which it might also be
desirable to do so. In particular, the impressive deterrent
power of RCO liability, especially in those corporations that
are too big to jail or too big to nail, suggests that we could be
tremendously well served by a vigorous and vibrant RCO
doctrine. Of course, if abuse were inevitable and its
consequences as devastating as an unwarranted criminal
conviction, that would suffice to persuade us that we should
abandon the doctrine. But such abuse is not inevitable. We
should, at the very least, hold our judgment until we
consider whether guidelines constraining the doctrine's use
might avoid the purported abuse. Part V.B seeks to advance
these guidelines.
2. No Corporate Crime
If the unfairness in the Buckyballs case resides in the fact
that there was no statutory violation whatsoever, the
unfairness in the cases contemplated in this section resides
in the fact that the violation in question was committed by
an employee of the corporation, but is not attributable to the
corporation as a whole. And, if there is no corporate
violation, then there is no reason to hold a corporate officer
who played no role in the violation responsible.
Scholars have widely criticized the criteria under federal
law for imputing an employee's criminal act to the
corporation. 93  According to these criteria, the corporation
93 See ANDREW WEISSMANN ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL
REFORM, REFORMING CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY To PROMOTE
RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 3 (2008), available at
http://ilr.iwssites.com/uploads/sites/1/WeissmannPaper.pdf; H. Lowell
Brown, Vicarious Criminal Liability of Corporations for the Acts of Their
Employees and Agents, 41 Loy. L. REV. 279, 288 (1995); Brent Fisse,
Restructuring Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault,
and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1183 (1983) (referring to the
confused jurisprudence around corporate criminal liability as "the blackest
hole in the theory of corporate criminal law."); John Hasnas, The
may be held criminally liable for any criminal act
undertaken by an employee within the scope of her
employment for the benefit of the corporation. 94  The
corporation can then be prosecuted or punished-even if it
neither authorized nor even knew about the employee's
crime, and even if the criminal act violated express corporate
policy and instructions95-because the employee's knowledge
can be imputed to the corporation. 96
Suppose that these critics are right that, in at least some
cases, the DOJ commits a grave injustice where it prosecutes
and punishes corporations for the criminal acts of rogue
employees. Better standards for attributing criminal
liability to the corporation exist, 97 and the preservation of
Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal
Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329, 1329 (2009). See generally Preet
Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul:
Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 53, 57 (2007) ("[Tlhe basic rule of corporate criminal liability has
few friends.").
94 The seminal case here is New York Cent. & H.R.R. Co. v. United
States, 212 U.S. 481, 491-94 (1909). See generally Developments in the
Law- Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal
Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1247-51 (1979).
95 See United States v. Hilton Hotels, 467 F.2d 1000, 1004, 1008 (9th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433
F.2d 174, 204-05 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711
F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1983) ("[A] corporation may be held criminally
responsible for antitrust violations committed by its employees ... even if,
as in Hilton Hotels and American Radiator, such acts were against
corporate policy or express instructions.").
96 See United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st
Cir. 1987).
97 One alternative can be found in the Model Penal Code's standard
for corporate criminal liability, which requires that "the commission of the
offense was authorized, requested, commanded, performed or recklessly
tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting in
behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or employment."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (1985). Commentators have arrived at
other standards. See Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for
Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1121-47
(1991); WILLIAM S. LAUFER, CORPORATE BODIES AND GUILTY MINDS: THE
FAILURE OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 58-60 (2006).
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the current standards violates compelling norms of justice
and desert, or so we may argue. As such, in a case where the
crime was committed by a "bad apple" in a setting where the
corporation did everything it reasonably could to ensure
employees' compliance with the law, we should resist
construing the bad apple's crime as a crime of the
corporation. But if that is so, then we should be especially
loath to prosecute and punish a corporation's corporate
officer for the bad apple's crime.
Albert Alschuler successfully lampoons the injustice of
holding a corporate officer responsible for the crime of an
employee where the employee's crime is not attributable to the
corporation.98 Alschuler likens the practice to the primitive
doctrine of frankpledge, in which all of the members of a
group could be subject to punishment for the wrongdoing of
any one of them if the wrongdoer escaped before being
apprehended. He goes on to contend that the modern-day
version of corporate criminal liability is even more regressive
than frankpledge, since it permits punishment of the group
even when the wrongdoer has already been convicted. 99
Alschuler's objection is captivating in no small part
because it echoes the wrong inherent in racism or terrorism,
where an entire group is made to suffer because of the
(alleged) wrongdoing of one or a few of its members. But the
objection also fails to recognize a key distinction: the wrong
of racism or terrorism (and perhaps frankpledge, too) arises
because the wrongdoer might not have sought to act on
behalf of the group and, even if she did, she was not
authorized to do so. Put differently, the wrongdoer's act is
not an act of the group, and so its members should not be
made to suffer for it. But the situation is different where the
crime is a crime of the group, even if it was carried out by
only a subset of the group's members.
Much of the resistance to the RCO doctrine arises where
and because the critic contemplates a case in which it is
98 See Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment
of Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1359 (2009).
99 See id. at 1380.
doubtful that the crime should have been attributed to the
corporation in the first place. Where this is so, punishing
executives is like frankpledge-they are punished only
because they share membership in the same entity, not
because the entity itself is blameworthy. A proper
transmission of responsibility from employee-offender to the
corporate officer must go through the corporation. The
employee's offense must first be one that is properly
attributed to the corporation; from there, we may be licensed
in holding the corporate officer responsible for it. But where
the employee's offense ought not to be attributed to the
corporation, because it is hers and hers alone, we are no
more licensed in holding an executive responsible for it than
we are in holding responsible a fellow member of the
offender's ethnic group, or church, or golf club, or alumni
society, and so on. Mere shared membership in the same
entity is not a ground of shared responsibility, as the
frankpledge worry rightly reflects. But shared membership
in the transgressing entity can be a ground of shared
responsibility, for the reasons adduced in Part IV.
3. Officers in Name Only
Helen Florence Weber was a housewife in Honolulu, HI,
when she found herself convicted of seventeen counts of
violating a statute prohibiting open fires.100 Mrs. Weber was
nominally the president and treasurer of her husband's car
wrecking business, Kailua Auto Wreckers, Inc. ("KAW"). In
1976, the year in which the offenses occurred, KAW openly
burned between 10,000 and 15,000 cars, as captured on film
by neighbors, notwithstanding repeated oral and written
warnings from the Hawaii Public Health agency. 10' Mrs.
Weber's role in the company was merely titular. In some
years, she attended the annual directors' meeting, in other
100 State v. Kailua Auto Wreckers, Inc., 615 P.2d 730, 733 n.1 (Haw.
1980). ("PHR Ch. 43, Sec. 7(a) states, in relevant part, 'no person shall
ignite, cause to be ignited, permit to be ignited or maintain any open
fire.").
101 See id.
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years she did not; on rare occasions, she ran errands for the
company. Mrs. Weber did not take an active part in the
business, she did not issue orders regarding business
operations, and she never set company policy.
10 2
Mrs. Weber's conviction was based on the RCO doctrine,
and her plight exemplifies another way in which it can go
awry in practice-namely, by subjecting individuals with no
meaningful connection to the corporation's crime to
prosecution and punishment. Proper application of the RCO
doctrine requires, then, that it is restricted to those who do
bear a meaningful connection to the corporation's crime.
To be clear, that connection need not involve participation
in or foreknowledge of the crime. As I argued in Part IV, the
executive is on the hook under a proper understanding of the
RCO doctrine not because she authorized, contributed to, or
even tolerated the crime. She is instead on the hook because
she is expected to occupy her role in a way that causes her to
see herself, and licenses others in seeing her, as implicated
in the crime. But the predicate for her responsibility then
becomes the normative expectation that she commit herself
to the corporation in this way. The Hawaii Supreme Court
was wrong to affirm Weber's conviction because she did not
harbor, and was not expected to harbor, the kind of
commitment to the corporation that grounds the account of
RCO liability advanced here. As with the other concerns
about the RCO doctrine, though, the remedy is not to
dispense with the doctrine altogether, but instead to
articulate principles restricting its application to those
corporate officers who deserve to bear responsibility.
4. Dilution and Desert
Of course, even if an intuition about shared responsibility
justifies blaming the corporate officer and supports the
application of the RCO doctrine, the question of when, and
why, executives' blameworthiness licenses criminal liability
remains. Elsewhere, it has been argued that the special
moral meaning of the criminal law makes it appropriate to
102 Kailua Auto Wreckers, 615 P.2d at 737.
subject the blameworthy executive to criminal, rather than
merely civil, liability."' 3  Here, a rubric has also been
developed to determine the magnitude of blame. 104 This
rubric demonstrates that the executive is far less
blameworthy than the crime's perpetrator. 10 5  Finally,
relatively light sanctions have been proposed that
correspond to the quantum of blame the executive
warrants. 106
If the executive prosecuted under the RCO doctrine really
does bear far less blame than the crime's perpetrator, one
might wonder whether wielding the RCO doctrine under
these circumstances does violence to the criminal law. The
worry is that holding corporate officers criminally liable
risks diluting the criminal law's moral force. This concern,
however, represents an unsubstantiated empirical claim.
We prosecute and punish misdemeanors as innocuous as
bringing a foreign-grown piece of fruit into the United
States, 1 7 as well as felonies as egregious as brutal rape-
murders or serial killings. There is no evidence that we are
incapable of distinguishing between these crimes on the
basis of their relative blameworthiness, or that criminalizing
the former in some way lessens our outrage in the face of the
latter. Furthermore, the dilution worry has traction only if
we subject individuals who are not blameworthy to criminal
liability. Part IV demonstrates that the executive, in light of
her expected commitment, is blameworthy. As long as
sanctions for the executive convicted under the RCO doctrine
are thoughtfully crafted and only punish the executive to the
extent that she bears blame, we need not worry about the
legitimacy or force of the criminal law. Again, the next
section points the way.
103 See Sepinwall, supra note 71, at 42.
104 See id. at 45-47.
105 Id. at 27, 32.
106 Id. at 42.
107 See Alfred Borcover, Sparky Sniffs Out Agricultural Crime at
O'Hare, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 26, 1989, at M2.
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B. Principles for Application
The purpose of the prior section was to establish that
concerns about the RCO doctrine are not endemic to the
doctrine itself; instead, they arise when it is applied in
contexts for which it was not intended, or which exceed its
justification as articulated in Part 1V. This section
formalizes the lessons from the problematic cases surveyed
above in an effort to arrive at guidelines ensuring that the
government restricts RCO liability to those cases where
corporate officers genuinely deserve blame.
1. Guideline #1: There Must Have Been a Crime,
and It Must Be Properly Attributable to the
Corporation
This guideline seeks to combine the lessons from both the
Buckyball case and the frankpledge worry. Again, the
Buckyball case looks unfair because the government
proceeded against the company's CEO without having
established that there was any statutory violation, and in
the face of facts that appeared not to involve any statutory
violation.0 8 In the case of frankpledge, we have a criminal
act, but it is not an act of the group; instead, the guilt
appropriately borne by one individual gets transmitted to
another individual who is innocent of the crime, merely
because they are members of the same group. 0 9 To protect
against these concerns, we should insist that there be a
criminal violation, and that it be properly attributable to the
corporation.
With that said, we need not insist upon a corporate
conviction as a predicate for RCO liability. Indeed, in
Dotterweich itself, Buffalo Pharmacal, the corporate entity,
was acquitted at trial.1 °  The Court noted that the
company's legal innocence did not entail its factual
innocence. For example, discomfort with corporate criminal
108 See Chenoweth, supra note 86.
109 See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
110 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279 (1943).
liability might have led the jury to acquit the corporate
defendant even though there was ample evidence from which
to conclude that it had violated the statutory provisions at
issue. However, even if the corporation escapes criminal
liability, we should insist upon evidence sufficient to have
convinced a reasonable jury of the corporation's guilt.
To be sure, knowing when and why some employee's (or
employees') criminal acts ought to be imputed to the
corporation is an incredibly vexing matter. By way of
illustration, consider that the prevailing state standard for
corporate criminal liability is radically different from the
federal standard,"' and commentators have proposed
different standards still.1 2 This paper does not seek to
intervene in this debate. Instead, it simply insists that RCO
liability is appropriate only where we have evidence that
would be sufficient to persuade a reasonable jury that there
is a corporate crime under whatever the governing standard
is. Where that is so, it is appropriate to prosecute and
punish the corporation officer, subject to Guidelines 2 and 3.
2. Guideline #2: The Executive Prosecuted Under
the RCO Doctrine Must Be One Whom We
Would Think It Appropriate to Credit When
the Corporation Does Well, and Blame When
the Corporation Does Wrong
The Dotterweich Court recognized that
[i]t would be too treacherous to define or even to
indicate by way of illustration the class of employees
which stands in such a responsible relation. To
attempt a formula.., would be mischievous futility.
In such matters the good sense of prosecutors, the
wise guidance of trial judges, and the ultimate
judgment of juries must be trusted. 113
111 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (1985).
112 See Bucy, supra note 97, 1121-46; William S. Laufer, Corporate
Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 647, 677-83 (2006).
113 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285.
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The Court was concerned about proceeding in an overly
formalistic manner by holding that title alone could be a
basis for RCO liability. 114 The Hawaii Supreme Court, in
affirming Helen Weber's conviction, seems to have ignored
the Court's guidance by failing to look beyond Weber's title.
If title is neither necessary nor sufficient, how should we
define the appropriate set of executives to target for RCO
liability? Much federal case law identifies the relevant factor
as the power of the corporate officer to control the conduct in
question, whether or not she sought to exercise this power.
Thus, a jury may find the corporate officer liable so long as
she "had 'authority with respect to the conditions that
formed the basis of the alleged violations,"' even if she did
not actually "exercise any authority over the activity" in
question. 115 That formulation is appealing in theory and
avoids imposing RCO liability on someone like Helen Weber.
But, it might nonetheless extend too far in practice. The
notion of authority can be capacious, leading to implausible
claims like the one in Park, where the president of Acme
Supermarkets was convicted for the company's rodent
infestation on the claim that he had the authority, and thus,
responsibility, to prevent or remedy the infestation. Park
should have been found responsible, but not because he had
the power to go to the Baltimore warehouse and lay rat traps
himself. The account advanced in Part IV provides a far
more convincing ground for holding someone like Park
responsible: an executive should recognize that, by virtue of
her position, the buck stops with her, and accept the
consequences that accompany that recognition. Thus, Park
is licensed in accepting kudos where his company does well,
even if it does well as a result of initiatives to which he bears
only the most tenuous of connections. Similarly, he must
114 See also United States v. Ming Hong, 242 F.3d 528, 531 (4th Cir.
2001) ("The gravamen of liability as a responsible corporate officer is not
one's corporate title or lack thereof .... ").
115 United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015, 1024 (9th Cir. 1998)
(internal quotations omitted) (upholding conviction of responsible
corporate officer, who was President and Chairman of the Board, under
the Clean Water Act).
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accept blame and sanctions where his company does wrong,
even if it does wrong in light of acts to which, again, he bears
only the most tenuous of connections.
More generally, we can delineate the set of corporate
officers properly held responsible by thinking about which of
them we would think appropriate objects of praise for a
laudable company performance. Correspondingly, these
same officers may be subject to prosecution and punishment
for the company's crime. As with Guideline #1, this
guideline does not seek to provide determinate criteria. The
Supreme Court's position in Dotterweich, allowing for a
situationist or particularist approach to the question of who
should count, is correct.1 6  Prosecutors should have to
establish, on a case-by-case basis, whether the executive
charged under the RCO doctrine occupies the kind of role
that makes her a member of the team, as it were. Judges
and juries will be best placed to evaluate whether a
prosecutor has met her burden in this regard.
3. Guideline #3: The Severity of the Sanctions the
Executive Convicted Under the RCO doctrine
Incurs Should Correspond to the Magnitude of
the Blame It Is Appropriate to Assign to Her
If the executive who neither participated in, nor culpably
failed to prevent, her corporation's crime is treated no less
harshly than those who carried out the crime on the
corporation's behalf, we will have done violence to the
institution of criminal law. We can secure the legitimacy of
deploying the criminal law here, then, only if we retain a
meaningful distinction between the magnitude of blame that
the executive and the perpetrator of the corporate crime
come to bear, and a corresponding distinction between the
severity of the sanctions each incurs.
116 See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284 ("Whether an accused shares
responsibility in the business process resulting in unlawful distribution
depends on the evidence produced at the trial and its submission-
assuming the evidence warrants it-to the jury under appropriate
guidance.").
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Elsewhere, a means of calculating relative
blameworthiness between various crimes has been
established, 117 as well as the kinds of sanctions that should
attend a finding of RCO liability (such as, for example,
disgorgement, compelled public apologies, and the like). 118
This Article will not rehearse the full panoply. The point is
that the maximum amount of blame properly assigned to the
defendant in an RCO case should be relatively minimal, and
the sanctions attending conviction correspondingly modest.
In significant part, we can understand the value of RCO
liability in light of its expressive dimension. By assuming
responsibility, the corporate officer recognizes not only that
she acts on the corporation's behalf, but also that it acts on
hers as well. This is part and parcel of the intertwining of
fates described in Part IV. Furthermore, by holding
corporate officers responsible, the public can express and
direct its outrage in the face of a corporate crime to the
corporation's human members. This will be especially
important in cases where there are no individuals who are
culpable of the corporate crime because, for example, it
resulted from the unforeseen confluence of multiple actions,
none of which were criminal in their own right, or where
those actions that were criminal pale in severity to the
overall corporate crime. 119
At the same time, while executives can serve as ready
targets for public indignation over corporate crime, we must
not risk treating them as scapegoats. It is for this reason
that maximum penalties for the responsible corporate officer
should be relatively modest, involving fines and symbolic
sanctions, but never incarceration.1 2 0 Restricting sanctions
in this way significantly undercuts the concern that
executives who have not contributed to their corporation's
117 See Sepinwall, supra note 71, at 45-47.
118 See id. at 46.
119 In fact, this might well have been the case in the BP explosion. See
NAT'L COMM'N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE
DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF
OFFSHORE DRILLING 89-128 (2011).
120 See Sepinwall, supra note 71, at 42.
crime would be treated more harshly than they deserve.
Moreover, if the sanctions correspond to the magnitude of the
executive's blame, it mitigates the concern that RCO liability
threatens to dilute the force of the criminal law.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our criminal law, at least as practiced, leaves us woefully
unable to respond appropriately to corporate crime.
Prosecuting and punishing the corporation (even assuming it
is not too big to fail or too big to nail) entails imposing upon
it mere fines for the violation. As such, corporate
prosecutions risk treating the corporate crime as no more
than a cost of doing business, as the Court noted in
Dotterweich.12 Prosecuting and punishing only the crime's
perpetrators, who are typically mid- or low-level employees,
risks treating the crime as if it were not the corporation's at
all. There is a meaningful sense in which the crime of a
corporation is the crime of the corporate officer, just as the
success of a corporation is the success of the corporate officer.
Our criminal law should recognize and sanction the
responsibility for corporate crime that corporate officers
bear.
At its inception, the RCO doctrine understood the
relationship between the executive and a crime of her
corporation in just this way. It was no embarrassment then,
and it ought not to be construed as an embarrassment now.
To be sure, if the doctrine were to be applied to cases where
it does not belong, an injustice would result. The RCO
doctrine, however, is not unique in this regard. Moreover, a
proper understanding of its rationale and appropriate scope,
which is provided here, should greatly reduce opportunities
for its misapplication.
Corporations should not be permitted to transgress with
impunity to the financial benefit of their executives and the
detriment of the rest of us. Corporate crime is the crime of
the corporation's officers. Our criminal law should
121 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 283.
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unabashedly acknowledge as much, and respond to it as
such.
